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•	Urges shareholders to vote for all of Methanex’s director nominees; highlights board’s track record of generating attractive shareholder returns

•	Shareholders are encouraged to vote only the WHITE Proxy or VIF in advance of the voting deadline on April 23, 2019 at 10:30 a.m. (Vancouver time)

•	Questions? Need help? Contact Kingsdale Advisors at 1-888-327-0821 or at contactus@kingsdaleadvisors.com

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“We would highlight the fact that Methanex's returns have consistently outpaced the peer subset and, more broadly and perhaps more importantly, the selected indices, each of which counts the Company as a constituent… All other factors held equal, we believe the data supports the notion that Methanex has historically been capable of managing large, capital intensive projects through industry cyclicality while generating attractive shareholder returns relative to suitable benchmarks.”

–	“In sum, then, we do not view Methanex as having particularly high-risk corporate governance architecture and find investors have consistently voted in a manner that suggests there are limited concerns with the current board composition.”

–	“We would suggest critical decisions around a board spill should focus considerably less on nominal standards of excessive tenure and more on the scrutinized particulars of the nominees targeted for replacement. In this regard, it should be noted M&G submits substantially no specific arguments in relation to the historical

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“M&G's own presentation, filed with SEDAR on April 5, 2019, highlights that [M&G] has routinely endorsed the Company's most complex and capital intensive initiatives to date, including physically transferring two plants several thousand miles and reopening several other production facilities. Further still, M&G acknowledges it initially offered support for the Geismar 3 project, subject to certain conditions. In short, then, it is worth noting [M&G] does not have an established history of raising doubts around comparable strategic actions, and, more pertinently, does not attempt to retroactively tie any of those actions to diminished shareholder value (a position we believe would be challenged by Methanex's aforementioned returns profile in any case).”

–	“Just as problematic is the fact that M&G is essentially seeking significant board change based on a highly speculative outcome in relation to the evaluation of Geismar 3, the potentially negative impact of which is heavily predicated on a series of uncertain assumptions and observations.”

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