UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549
SCHEDULE 14A
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Inter-Tel (Delaware), Incorporated
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Inter-Tel (Delaware), Incorporated has prepared a slide presentation to use at investor meetings. This presentation was first given to Institutional Shareholder Services on June 15, 2007.
A copy of this slide presentation follows:
ISS Presentation:
Inter-Tel Stockholders Should Vote FOR the Mitel Merger
June 15, 2007
Business Overview
The Merger
The Recapitalization Proposal Merger Rationale Views on Recapitalization Proposal Research Commentary Conclusion
1 |
|
Business Overview
Inter-Tel at a Glance
Headquarters: Phoenix, Arizona
Founded: 1969
Ticker: INTL (Nasdaq)
Employees: 1,900+
Focus: Converged voice and data business communications systems and applications for the small and medium sized business (SMB) market
Design, engineer, sell and install voice communications systems, call processing software, applications, solutions and services
Focus: 20-500 line size (approximately 10%+/- market share) and moving up in line size
Among the top three vendors by market share
Provides a full suite of voice products, including IP networking and convergence
Voice and data convergence applications
Software applications for presence, mobility, collaboration and CRM
ROI/Total Cost of Ownership with a managed services approach
Single point of accountability for the customer
2 |
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Business Overview
Inter-Tel Share Price Performance
02/22/06
Mihaylo resigns as CEO
04/10/06
Mihaylo files proxy statement to nominate an alternate slate of directors and submit several shareholder resolutions to be voted on at shareholder meeting
06/14/06
Mihaylo/Vector Capital submit cash offer $22.50 per share for Inter-Tel
08/21/06
Mihaylo/Vector indicate willingness to increase cash offer to $23.25
10/24/06
Stockholders reject Sell the Company Resolution at the Special Meeting of Shareholders
04/26/07
Mitel merger announced
03/02/07
Mihaylo announces his intention to nominate a slate of 5 directors (including himself) for election to the Board
Stock Price ($)
30.0 27.5 25.0 22.5 20.0 17.5
Volume Price
Feb-06 Apr-06 Jun-06 Aug-06 Nov-06 Jan-07 Mar-07 Jun-07
Volume (000s)
3,000 2,000 1,000 0
Source: FactSet and Company filings
3
The Merger
The Mitel Merger
$25.60 cash per share for 100% of Inter-Tel stock
Strategic buyer (Mitel Networks) with backing from financial sponsor (Francisco Partners)
Fully funded from cash on hand and firm financing commitments
Limited customary closing conditions; antitrust condition satisfied June 12, 2007
Expected to close in early July 2007
The Board of Directors received a fairness opinion from its financial advisor prior to signing
4 |
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The Merger
Background of the Merger
Since 2003, the Company has actively engaged in discussions with a number of potential strategic and financial buyers regarding business combinations and other alternatives
The Company was effectively put in play in 2006 by the Mihaylo/Vector takeover bids and Mr. Mihaylos Sell the Company campaign
June 14: Mihaylo and Vector Capital proposed to acquire all outstanding shares of Inter-Tel common stock for $22.50 per share, rejected by Special Committee of the Board as inadequate
August 21: Mihaylo and Vector Capital sent a letter to Inter-Tel indicating that they were prepared to raise the acquisition proposal to a best and final offer of $23.25 per share, also rejected by Special Committee as inadequate
August 25: Mihaylo demanded a special meeting of stockholders to consider a Sell the Company resolution, ultimately rejected by approximately 2 to 1 margin by disinterested stockholders
During this time, Mihaylo publicly stated he would support sale to highest bidder
Inter-Tel re-approached parties regarding negotiations of potential business combination transactions for a number of months prior to announcing the Mitel merger
5 |
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The Merger
Board Process
In an August 11, 2006 Press Release, Inter-Tel announced, The Special Committee has authorized UBS Investment Bank, the Companys financial advisor, to review and explore various strategic options for the Company
The same day, in a letter to Mihaylo, Alexander L. Cappello, writing on behalf of the Special Committee, noted the Committees decision to explore all options
October 2006: Special Committee stated it would absolutely consider a sale if [it] were to determine that a sale would result in greater value for stockholders than continuing to pursue the companys strategic plan or pursuing another alternative
April 26, 2007: Special Committee and the Board approved the Mitel merger at a price significantly above Mihaylos best and final offer
Industry-related synergies enabled Mitel to pay premium price
Negotiated an increased price and improved terms over the original Mitel offer
Neither Management nor Board members will receive any special treatment/compensation from Mitel in connection with the Mitel merger
During the Mitel negotiations, the Company approached other potential buyers to determine possible interest
6 |
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The Merger
Board Process (cont.)
The Mitel Merger Agreement:
Negotiated at arms length by Special Committee
Includes provisions which allow the Company to pursue superior proposals
Specifically negotiated ability to engage in buyout discussions with Mr. Mihaylo and Vector Capital
Vector Capital submitted non-binding conditional proposal to acquire Inter-Tel at $26.50 per share
Special Committee promptly declared that indication could potentially lead to superior proposal
Vector was given full access to diligence materials and Management
After due diligence, Vector failed to submit any offer
Mihaylo currently is being allowed to conduct due diligence on the Company
No other bidders have come forward
7 |
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The Recapitalization Proposal
Proposal Summary
Mihaylo is proposing a $375 million self-tender offer by Inter-Tel, to be funded by:
$200 million of cash from Inter-Tel
$200 million to be borrowed by Inter-Tel
Mihaylo strategy proposes share buyback of 13.4 million shares at $28.00/share, we believe that Mihaylo could only purchase 12.4 million shares based on current Management cash estimates
In the proposed self-tender offer, Inter-Tel stockholders would receive cash for less than 60% of their shares1 (assuming all stockholders other than Mihaylo tendered)
The shares not purchased would remain at market risk as stub shares of a micro-cap company
As he has publicly conceded in a stockholder letter on June 14, 2007, less than 50% of shares could be tendered for cash
Mihaylo has publicly stated that he may raise up to another $80 million by selling unspecified Inter-Tel assets to fund transaction expenses and to provide for general working capital needs
1 |
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Based on a repurchase of 12.4 million shares |
8 |
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Merger Rationale
Greater Value, More Certainty and Less Risk
The Mitel merger is in the best interests of all stockholders
Greater Economic Value:
Mitel merger pays all stockholders $25.60 per share for 100% of their shares
Mihaylos front-loaded leveraged recapitalization strategy pays cash for less than 60% of each stockholders shares1 and leaves the remaining stub shares subject to market risk as a micro-cap stock
We believe the recapitalization strategy would yield a value substantially below the $25.60 Mitel price
More Certainty:
Mitel has firm financing cash commitments merger expected to close early July 2007
Recapitalization plan is subject to financing, due diligence, unspecified assets sales and other conditions and contingencies
1 |
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Based on Management cash projections; we estimate 12.4 million shares could be repurchased assuming Mihaylos debt financing projections |
9 |
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Merger Rationale
Greater Value, More Certainty and Less Risk (cont.)
Mihaylos actions create uncertainty
Attempted to buy the Company in 2006 at inadequate $22.50 and $23.25 share prices
Tried to force sale to highest bidder in late 2006, yet now does not support Mitel merger
Actively negotiated to sell his shares to Company at market price shortly before the Mitel merger announcement, but now claims stock is worth significantly more
Less Risk: Mitel merger pays cash to 100% of the stockholders in one month, while Mihaylo recapitalization plan pays cash for less than 60% of each stockholders shares1:
Mihaylo stated that, . . .the size of the self-tender offer could be reduced. . .to meet short term cash needs 2
Mihaylos model assumes more cash than the Company expects to have
If Mihaylo tenders his shares it could significantly reduce the number of shares that could be sold by other Inter-Tel stockholders
Mihaylo has sent inconsistent messages with regard to whether he would or would not tender his shares
1 |
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Based on Management cash projections; we estimate 12.4 million shares could be repurchased assuming Mihaylos debt financing projections |
2 |
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Mihaylo preliminary proxy statement filed June 8, 2007 |
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Merger Rationale
Greater Value, More Certainty and Less Risk (cont.)
Stub shares would remain subject to market risk and could decline significantly in value
Inter-Tel would likely be a micro-cap stock
Inter-Tel would have no meaningful cash reserves and significant debt
Inter-Tel stock is not likely to trade at a premium as an attractive takeover candidate given Mihaylos potential veto right on any sale
Effect of Mihaylos proposed and unspecified asset sales on EBITDA and EPS is unknown
Mihaylos personal interests and long-term strategic plan may conflict with what is best for the other stockholders
Under recapitalization proposal, Inter-Tel would continue in a highly competitive industry
Depleted cash reserves and significant leverage will dramatically reduce Inter-Tels strategic flexibility and ability to adapt to changes in the industry
Enterprise VOIP is radically changing the competitive landscape as data networking vendors such as Cisco are trying to take market share from legacy PBX vendors in the converged data market
Increased competition from non-traditional enterprise communications and open source software providers such as Microsoft are entering the market
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Views on Recapitalization Proposal
Recapitalization Calculations are Analytically Flawed and Misleading
Mihaylo calculations are based on P/E multiples and future pro forma earnings, not current cash flows
His calculations assume a fundamental increase in the enterprise value of Inter-Tel by approximately $177 million through financial engineering with no corresponding improvement in cash flow or operations
We believe cash flow (EBITDA) multiples, not future P/E multiples, is the most appropriate methodology to assess value
Remaining stub shares are subject to increased risk and price volatility
Significantly smaller market cap: would be micro-cap stock
Trading liquidity would likely be significantly reduced due to lower analyst and institutional interest, as well as other factors
Reduced takeover expectations due to increased debt load and Mihaylos potential veto right on any sale
Post recapitalization, the operating company will be fundamentally different than what is reflected in Managements projections in Inter-Tels proxy statement
Inter-Tel would be highly leveraged, with a Debt / EBITDA leverage ratio of approximately 4.0x versus the current debt-free status
Inter-Tels strategic flexibility and ability to compete would be significantly impaired due to its significant debt and minimal cash reserves
12
Views on Recapitalization Proposal
We Believe Inter-Tel Stock Would Trade At or Below its Historical EBITDA Multiple If Mihaylos Proposed Recapitalization is Completed
In the months leading up to the Mitel merger announcement we believe trading multiples expanded due to takeover expectation
If the recapitalization is completed, we believe the takeover expectation and premium would disappear and Inter-Tel will likely trade closer to the historical average 7.1x EBITDA multiple
LTM EV/EBITDA
Historical Average 7.1x
Pre Merger Announcement Multiple 9.6x
Multiple (x)
12
10
8
6
4
2
Jun-05 Oct-05 Feb-06 Jun-06 Oct-06 Feb-07 Jun-07
Source: FactSet
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Views on Recapitalization Proposal
Based Upon the Companys Historical EBITDA Multiple, We Believe the Total Value Received by Stockholders Would be Substantially Below the Mitel Offer
Through financial engineering, Mihaylo has inappropriately assumed a significant increase in the enterprise value of the business
Mihaylos estimated share price implicitly assumes that post-recapitalization Inter-Tel stock would trade at almost double its historical LTM EBITDA multiple
Historical |
Pre Merger | |||||
Average |
Announcement | |||||
($ in millions, except per share data) |
||||||
Pro Forma Trading Analysis |
||||||
LTM EV / EBITDA Multiple |
7.1x |
8.3x |
9.6x | |||
LTM EBITDA2 |
$50.2 |
$50.2 |
$50.2 | |||
Implied Pro Forma Enterprise Value |
$356.7 |
$419.1 |
$481.6 | |||
Implied Pro Forma Equity Value3 |
$186.1 |
$248.5 |
$311.0 | |||
Current Fully Diluted Shares Outstanding4 |
28.521 |
28.521 |
28.521 | |||
Implied Stub Equity Share Price4 |
$6.53 |
$8.71 |
$10.90 | |||
Implied Per Share Cash Tender Amount5 |
$12.20 |
$12.20 |
$12.20 | |||
Blended Per Share Value to Shareholders |
$18.72 |
$20.91 |
$23.10 | |||
Upside / (Downside) to Mitel Offer |
(26.9%) |
(18.3%) |
(9.8%) |
Mihaylo Estimate 1 |
||
Pro Forma CY2008 EPS |
$1.84 | |
Assumed CY2008 P/E Multiple |
16.5x | |
Implied Pro Forma Stub Share Price |
$30.46 | |
Pro Forma Fully Diluted Shares |
15.706 | |
Pro Forma Enterprise Value |
$658.7 | |
Pro Forma Equity Value |
$478.4 | |
Implied LTM EV / EBITDA Multiple |
13.1x |
1 |
|
Per RBC Capital Markets, Leveraged Recapitalization Analysis dated 6/01/07 |
2 |
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LTM pro forma EBITDA as of 3/31/07; refer to page 23 for GAAP reconciliation detail |
3 |
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Assumes post-tender debt balance of $200.6mm and balance sheet cash of $30.0 |
4 |
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Based on 27.012mm basic shares as of 4/02/07; assumes 4.395mm options (as of 3/23/07 per Inter-Tel management) convert based on treasury stock method at $28.00 |
5 |
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Assumes Total Cash Tender Amount of $347.9mm (Based on Management cash projections and excludes asset sales) divided by current fully diluted shares outstanding |
14
Views on Recapitalization Proposal
Moreover, the Recapitalization Appears to be Under-Funded
Mihaylos front-loaded leveraged recapitalization strategy assumes available cash of $200 million to fund a purchase of 13.4 million shares
However, Management forecasts available cash of only $177 million1 to fund the share repurchase, and to pay $20 million Mitel break-up fee, proxy expenses and transaction expenses
This means there may be only sufficient cash to purchase 12.4 million shares
Mihaylo has indicated that he may raise additional funds through unspecified asset sales
We believe he would likely sell balance sheet leases, the Lake business unit and the Reno Facility, which Inter-Tel anticipates would reduce FY2008 EBITDA by $10 million, which is not reflected in Mihaylos valuation calculations2
1 |
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Cash forecasts have been provided to Mihaylo via diligence materials |
2 |
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Based on prior Mihaylo statements |
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Views on Recapitalization Proposal
Recapitalization Calculations Improperly Rely on Inter-Tel Projections
Mihaylo has improperly co-opted Inter-Tels projections and asked that Inter-Tels stockholders rely upon them in a manner that Inter-Tel specifically cautioned against
Inter-Tels projections rely on assumptions that would no longer apply in the event of the recapitalization. Inter-Tels projections assumed:
Inter-Tel would have significant cash reserves and the financial flexibility to invest in its technology and distribution channels
Inter-Tel would not be forced to sell its assets to raise cash
Inter-Tel would not continue to incur expenses and disruption resulting from questions as to the ownership, control and future of the Company
After the recapitalization, Inter-Tel would be a different company:
Inter-Tel would have no meaningful cash reserves and a $200 million debt burden
Assuming asset sales of $80 million, EBITDA is estimated to be reduced by $10 million
Due to financial constraints, we believe the Inter-Tels product roadmap and engineering resources could be curtailed
16
Views on Recapitalization Proposal
Mihaylo Interests May Conflict With Those of Other Stockholders
Mihaylo would own over 36%1 of the pro forma entity versus his current ownership level of 19%, which would give him significant control and a potential veto on any future sale of the Company
Mihaylos interests as by far the largest single stockholder may conflict with those of other Inter-Tel stockholders
His long-term strategy for the Company may entail a much longer time horizon than would benefit the average stockholder
Mr. Mihaylo has publicly admitted that the recapitalization plan may not succeed 2
If the recapitalization strategy fails, he is best positioned to takeover the Company, because his front-loaded leveraged recapitalization strategy uses the Companys cash and credit to eliminate approximately 60% of the shares he does not own, giving him a shorter and cheap path to a future takeover
1 Based on a repurchase of 12.4 million shares and assumes Mihaylo does not tender any shares
2 In a June 6, 2007 article in the Ottawa Citizen by Bert Hill entitled Mitel challenger drops out of Inter-Tel fight; Ousted company CEO unveils plan to top Mitel offer Mr. Mihaylo stated If I am able to turn things around, [Inter-Tel stockholders] will get the benefit of the improvement. And if I am wrong they will still be able to get out at $25 or so. Permission to reprint or use these statements was neither sought nor obtained (emphasis added)
17
Views on Recapitalization Proposal
Actions words
We believe INTL stock would trade significantly lower without the proposed Mihaylo-Vector offer (Stockholder presentation filed by Steven Mihaylo and Vector Capital with the SEC, September 21, 2006, in support of their proposed buyout at $23.25/share)
We believe that Inter-Tels stock may fall significantly given market benchmarks (Stockholder presentation filed by Steven Mihaylo and Vector Capital with the SEC, September 21, 2006, in support of their proposed buyout at $23.25/share)
Steve Mihaylo, and his 19.4% vote, will support higher offers from other parties, should they exist (Press Release Issued by Steven Mihaylo and Vector Capital, October 10, 2006)
The most important fact being that this Resolution is designed to allow the stockholders to prompt a process to maximize the value of your shares whether that be to us at $23.25/share or to another buyer at an even higher price. (Press Release Issued by Steven Mihaylo and Vector Capital, October 16, 2006)
Shareholders will be able to sell about 70 per cent of their stock at $28 and let the rest ride with the company.
(Steven Mihaylo as quoted In a June 6, 2007 article in the Ottawa Citizen by Bert Hill entitled Mitel challenger drops out of Inter-Tel fight; Ousted company CEO unveils plan to top Mitel offer)
[Mihaylo] wont sell his own 19 per cent stake. (June 6, 2007 article in the Ottawa Citizen by Bert Hill entitled Mitel challenger drops out of Inter-Tel fight; Ousted company CEO unveils plan to top Mitel offer)
Under my proposal, 60.6% of the shares presently outstanding could be purchased at $28 per share assuming that I do not tender any shares .If I tender a pro rata portion of my shares (to alleviate concerns of my increased influence), 49.1% of all shares presently outstanding could be purchased at $28 per share (June 14, 2007 letter to stockholders issued by Steven Mihaylo)
Note: Permission to reprint these quotes has neither been sought nor obtained (emphasis added)
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Research Commentary
Research Analysts Reacted Favorably To Mitel Offer and Express Doubt Over Mihaylos Actions
Inter-Tel has apparently deemed the offer to be credible and intends to review the proposal; however, we think all cash offer by Mitel is more secure now (Wedbush Morgan, June 6, 2007)
Overall, we are a bit confused by Mr. Mihaylos actions and do not understand why he believes Inter-Tel is worth more than $25.60 today when only back in October he believed a fair purchase price was $23.25. In addition, we think the distractions resulting from the ongoing uncertainty have had a negative impact on Inter-Tels current business performance. (Kaufman Bros, June 6, 2007)
We believe this is a fair price, since new products that are key to Inter-Tels futurethe IP-based 5000 and 7000 platformshave only recently been introduced and the 7000 in particular has not seen solid customer uptake to this point.
(Bear Stearns, April 27, 2007)
we believe the company has been well shopped and a higher offer is unlikely to materialize (Brean Murray Carret, April 27, 2007)
This is a significant premium to its peers, whose median multiple on 2007 EPS is 20, and one that we do not think is warranted. In addition, based on work calculating a takeout value when the former CEO was fighting to take the company private, we arrived at a value of $22-$24 per share it is a more than fair deal for stockholders (Kaufman Brothers Equity, April 27, 2007)
We think the distraction of another proxy battle will create upheaval as the company attempts to roll out its new strategy to attack the medium and large size enterprise market. The attempted buyout of the company by the former CEO in 2006, which lasted several months, created a significant distraction for management and employees. We believe this contributed to the lackluster results throughout the year. In our view, this pattern may repeat in 2007. Furthermore, should Mihaylo gain greater control of the board, we believe short term instability would benefit competitors such as Avaya. (Wedbush Morgan Securities, April 3, 2007)
Note: Permission to reprint these quotes has neither been sought nor obtained (emphasis added)
19
Conclusion
Certain Value versus Real Risk
Mitel Merger |
Mihaylo Recapitalization | |||
Mitel has firm debt financing commitments and |
Insufficient balance sheet cash to fully fund | |||
Funding |
financial support from Francisco Partners Subject only to customary closing conditions; |
proposed recap would require $200 million debt financing and potential asset sales Subject to financing, due diligence, unspecified | ||
Certainty |
antitrust condition was met on June 12, 2007 Full cash value would be paid to ALL Inter-Tel |
assets sales and other conditions Front-loaded leveraged transaction would pay | ||
Stockholder Liquidity |
stockholders for 100% of their shares Inter-Tel stockholders will have receive |
cash for less than 60% of non-Mihaylo shares and potentially substantially less We believe value of cash plus stub shares of a | ||
Total Consideration |
$25.60/share in cash for 100% of their shares Stockholder vote scheduled for June 29, 2007; |
micro-cap company would be substantially less than the Mitel offer price Recapitalization/buyback may not be completed, | ||
Path to Payment |
expected to close in early July 2007 |
could be materially changed or could be significantly delayed Mihaylo would gain de facto control with potential veto right on future sale, paid for at other | ||
Control |
Control premium paid to 100% of stockholders |
stockholders expense with Inter-Tel cash and credit |
20
About Inter-Tel (Delaware), Incorporated
Inter-Tel (Nasdaq: INTL) offers value-driven communications products; applications utilizing networks and server-based communications software; and a wide range of managed services that include voice and data network design and traffic provisioning, custom application development, and financial solutions packages. An industry-leading provider focused on the communication needs of business enterprises, Inter-Tel employs approximately 1,940 communications professionals, and services business customers through a network of 57 company-owned, direct sales offices and approximately 300 authorized providers in North America, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia and South Africa. More information is available at www.inter-tel.com.
Forward-Looking Statements
This presentation contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, as amended, concerning the pending acquisition of Inter-Tel by Mitel and the recapitalization proposed by Mr. Mihaylo, among other things. Forward-looking statements are statements in the future tense or that include words such as intends, believe, expect, proposed, anticipates and words of similar import.
Forward-looking statements are based on assumptions, suppositions and uncertainties, as well as on managements best possible evaluation of future events. However, actual results may differ materially from those reflected in forward-looking statements based on a number of factors, many of which are beyond the control of Inter-Tel. Such factors may include, without excluding other considerations, fluctuations in quarterly results, evolution in customer demand for Inter-Tels products and services, risks associated with the proposed acquisition by Mitel or the outcome of any discussions with or actions by Mr. Mihaylo, the impact of price pressures exerted by competitors, and general market trends or economic changes.
21
Disclaimer
This presentation includes statements and information from published material, public filings and other such sources. Permission to reprint or use these statements and information was neither sought nor obtained.
Additional Information
In connection with the pending Mitel merger, Inter-Tel filed a definitive proxy statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 29, 2007. INVESTORS AND SECURITY HOLDERS ARE ADVISED TO READ THE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT AND ANY AMENDMENTS OR SUPPLEMENTS THERETO BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN, OR WILL CONTAIN, IMPORTANT INFORMATION. Copies of the definitive proxy statement and other documents filed by can be obtained without charge at the Securities and Exchange Commissions web site at www.sec.gov or from Inter-Tel by contacting Inter-Tel (Delaware), Incorporated, Attention: Investor Relations, 1615 S. 52nd Street, Tempe, AZ 85281, Telephone: 480-449-8900.
Inter-Tel and its directors, officers and employees may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of proxies from its stockholders in connection with the proposed merger with Mitel. Information concerning the interests of Inter-Tels participants in the solicitation is included in the definitive proxy statement.
Inter-Tel and the Inter-Tel logo, are trademarks of Inter-Tel (Delaware), Incorporated.
22
GAAP Reconciliation
This presentation includes some non-GAAP financial measures, as defined in Regulation G promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. The following table includes the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures and a reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measures to such comparable GAAP financial measures:
(US$ in millions, unless indicated) |
LTM | |||||||||
Q206A |
Q306A |
Q406A |
Q107A |
Period | ||||||
Revenue |
115.9 |
117.0 |
118.5 |
109.5 |
460.9 | |||||
Cost of Goods Sold |
59.1 |
58.9 |
59.0 |
56.1 |
233.1 | |||||
Gross Profit |
56.8 |
58.1 |
59.5 |
53.4 |
227.8 | |||||
SG&A1 |
39.0 |
39.4 |
40.3 |
40.5 |
159.2 | |||||
R&D |
8.5 |
8.4 |
7.5 |
7.9 |
32.3 | |||||
Total Operating Expenses |
47.5 |
47.8 |
47.8 |
48.4 |
191.5 | |||||
EBIT |
9.3 |
10.3 |
11.7 |
5.0 |
36.3 | |||||
Depreciation |
2.3 |
2.4 |
2.4 |
2.2 |
9.2 | |||||
Amortization |
1.2 |
1.2 |
1.2 |
1.1 |
4.7 | |||||
Pro Forma EBITDA |
12.7 |
13.9 |
15.3 |
8.3 |
50.2 | |||||
Less FAS 123R Expense, & Proxy Related Expenses & Other |
2.7 |
4.0 |
2.6 |
2.9 |
12.2 | |||||
GAAP EBITDA |
10.1 |
9.9 |
12.8 |
5.4 |
38.1 |
Source: Public Filings & Management Note: 1 Includes amortization of intangibles
23